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28.1 Introduction
There exists no crime of aggression, whether as agreed in Kampala or in any other
form, in any of the bodies of criminal law respectively applicable in the jurisdic-
tions of the United Kingdom (UK).1 No crime of aggression has been legislatively
enacted. Nor has any such crime been recognised judicially; on the contrary, in
2006 the highest appellate court in England and Wales ruled in R v. Jones
(Margaret) that the crime of aggression as embodied at the time, according to the
court, in customary international law did not and could not constitute a non-
statutory crime under domestic law.2 What is more, the UK shows no sign for
now of intending to ratify3 the Kampala amendment on the crime of aggression,4
making domestic enactment of the crime unlikely for the foreseeable future.
There is no inherent legal reason, however, why any future statutory crime of
aggression in the UK should prove to be unworkable, notwithstanding what might
be thought to have been suggested in Jones (Margaret); and the fundamental
principles that obtain under at least the law of England and Wales frequently
obtain, mutatis mutandis, under the laws of a range of states of the common law
and Westminster parliamentary traditions.
Nor is consideration of the law of the UK irrelevant to the history of the crime of
aggression.What the court said in Jones (Margaret) as to the content of the crime as
1 England and Wales jointly, Scotland and Northern Ireland, while each part of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, comprise three separate jurisdictions within it, each with a different system of
courts applying a different body of law. The constitutional principles of the United Kingdom as such, however,
are common. Reference in this chapter to ‘the UK courts’ is to the respective courts of England and Wales, of
Scotland and of Northern Ireland.
2 See R v. Jones (Margaret) and Others [2006] UKHL 16, [2007] 1 AC 136.
3 See, for example, the Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce’s strategy paper on the International Criminal Court,
17 July 2013, available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-criminal-court-strategy-paper,
in which, among the various outlined policy initiatives aimed at supporting the Court, no mention is made of the
crime of aggression. See, similarly, the section ‘Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law’, including the discussion
of the Court, in Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign &
Commonwealth Ofﬁce Report, Cm 8593 (2013).
4 Review Conference RC/Res.6, ‘The Crime of Aggression’, 11 June 2010, in Review Conference Ofﬁcial
Records, RC/11, part II, 17.
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a putative matter of customary international law retains a degree of interest, even if
its enduring value is not great.
28.2 The Current State of the Law
28.2.1 Aggression not a Statutory Crime
No legislation establishes the crime of aggression as a crime under the law of
England and Wales, under Scots law or under the law of Northern Ireland. While
the International Criminal Court Act 2001, an Act of the UK Parliament making
legislative provision for England andWales and for Northern Ireland, respectively,
and the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001, an Act of the devolved
Scottish Parliament5 making provision for Scots law, enact into domestic law the
offences of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes over which the
International Criminal Court enjoys jurisdiction ratione materiae by virtue of
article 5 and articles 6–8 of the Rome Statute, neither Act created or has since
been amended to create a domestic crime of aggression.
28.2.2 Aggression not a Common Law Crime
Nor does the crime of aggression constitute a judicially created or ‘common law’
crime in any of the jurisdictions of the UK. In the criminal case of R v. Jones
(Margaret), which ﬁrst came before the English courts6 in 2004, the defence
submitted that the crime of aggression alleged to exist under customary interna-
tional law was cognizable as a crime under the common law of England andWales.
On ﬁnal appeal in 2006, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (better
known simply, if imprecisely,7 as the House of Lords) – which, despite its poten-
tially misleading name, was at the time the highest appellate court in the UK on
most8 legal matters – dismissed the defence’s argument, clarifying that the crime of
5 A Scottish Parliament – which had not existed since the then-independent kingdoms of Scotland and England
united in 1707 to form a single Kingdom of Great Britain, with its sole parliament at Westminster – was created
by the Scotland Act 1998, an Act of the UK Parliament. (Note that, on the formal union of the kingdoms of Great
Britain and Ireland in 1801, the former was renamed the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the name
changing once more in 1927 to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to reﬂect the grant of
independence to the Irish Free State in 1922.)
6 The courts that sit throughout England andWales and the law applied by them are, as a consequence of the legal
absorption of long-conquered Wales into England via the Laws in Wales Acts 1535 and 1542, English courts
applying English law, even if today one speaks of ‘the courts of England andWales’ and ‘the law of England and
Wales’.
7 The House of Lords is the upper house of the UK’s bicameral legislature, of which the former judicial body also
referred to as the House of Lords was formally, since the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, a subsidiary organ.
With the coming into force of the Constitutional ReformAct 2005, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords
was abolished and replaced by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.
8 One ﬁeld in which the House of Lords was not the court of ﬁnal appeal was the criminal law of Scotland.
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aggression was not and, indeed, could not be a common law crime under English
law.9 The decision, although formally precedential in relation to English law alone,
was reached on the basis of principles shared by both Scots law and the law of
Northern Ireland.
28.2.2.1 Domestic Legal Background
Under the constitutional dispensation prevailing in the UK, the legislature is not
alone in its authority to make law. The UK constitution10 admits of judicial law-
making, in the sense that rules of decision and broader legal principles enunciated
by the courts in the adjudication of cases comprise part of the law of the land.11
The rules and principles laid down or, according to the traditional ﬁction, ‘declared’
by the courts are known collectively as ‘common law’. The scope allowed for the
judicial pronouncement of common law rules has varied over the centuries. Most
relevantly, although it was formerly the accepted practice for judges to create
crimes, the rise of popular democracy and a growing sensitivity to the more formal
aspects of the rule of law led the courts in time to renounce their competence to
recognise novel offences.12
As regards the status of international law within the respective bodies of domestic
law applicable in the UK, this has traditionally been a question for the courts. With
regard to customary international law speciﬁcally, the position adopted by the judges
since the eighteenth century has been that, in contrast to the position in relation to
treaties, it is unnecessary for a rule of customary international law to be enacted into
domestic law by the legislature before the courts may give effect to it.13 Customary
international law, it has been said, is part of the common law,14 with the consequence
that the courts may declare and apply its rules in the exercise of their mandate to
9 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2.
10 Unlike the constitutions of most states, the UK constitution is not set down in a formal document. Rather,
what is frequently referred to, not wholly accurately, as the UK’s ‘unwritten’ constitution consists of
a miscellany of statutory and judicially enunciated principles and established practices (or ‘conventions’),
which, by virtue of their subject matter and perceived status, are acknowledged by consensus to enjoy
a constitutional quality.
11 The same was true under the independent English and Scottish constitutional arrangements that predated the
union of the two kingdoms and their respective parliaments in 1707. The pre-union English courts created case
law, as did the Scottish courts.
12 See, for example, Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v.Director of Public Prosecutions [1973]
AC 435.
13 See, for example, Triquet v. Bath (1764) 3 Burr 1478, at 1481; Chung Chi Cheung v. The King [1939] AC 160,
at 167–68; Trendtex Trading Corporation v.Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529, at 554. The principles ﬁrst
and most fully propounded in this regard by the English courts and elaborated on by the Privy Council have
been judicially adopted in Scotland. See, for example, Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2000 2001 JC 143,
at para. 23. They can be taken to be consonant with the law of Northern Ireland as well.
14 See, for example, Triquet, supra note 13, at 1481; Trendtex, supra note 13, at 554. See, similarly, Lord
Advocate’s Reference No. 1, supra note 13, at para. 23 (‘A rule of customary international law is a rule of
Scots law’).
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declare and apply the common law. Despite suggestions to the contrary,15 however,
this proposition had never been put to the test in the context of crimes under
customary international law, and the hypothetical possibility that the courts might
declare punishable at common law a customary international crime sat uneasily with
the courts’ relinquishment of their former power to enunciate new offences.
As for judicial review of executive action, the courts of the various jurisdictions
in the UK have developed principles of administrative law by reference to which
they can scrutinise and, in appropriate cases, declare void executive acts. But not all
conduct of the executive is justiciable. There remain certain exercises of the royal
prerogative16 wielded on behalf of the sovereign, according to the conventions of
the UK’s constitutional monarchy, by the executive that the courts acknowledge as
beyond their adjudicative purview by virtue of the constitutional separation of
powers. Among these so-called ‘forbidden’ areas are the government’s conduct of
foreign affairs, its making of war and, to the extent that this may differ from the
latter, its deployment of Her Majesty’s armed forces.
When it comes to the acts of foreign states, LordWilberforce enunciated a broad
principle of non-justiciability in Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer (No. 3), where
his Lordship stated that the English courts will not adjudicate on the legality, under
either municipal or international law, of ‘the transactions of foreign sovereign
states’17 or, synonymously, ‘acts done abroad by virtue of sovereign authority’.18
The avowed reason for this is a lack of ‘judicial or manageable standards’19 by
which to judge such issues. This rule, often referred to as ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability,
is said to be ‘not one of discretion’ but, rather, ‘inherent in the very nature of the
judicial process’.20
It was against this legal backdrop that Jones (Margaret) came before the English
courts.
28.2.2.2 R v. Jones (Margaret)
The twenty appellant-defendants in the three appeals before the House of Lords, all
of them peace activists, had been charged with a range of criminal offences arising
out of their unauthorised entry onto military land and disruption of activities
15 See Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at paras. 20–22 (Lord Bingham), 101 (Lord Mance). For an elaboration on
the incorrectness of their Lordship’s suggestion, see R. O’Keefe, ‘The Doctrine of Incorporation Revisited’,
British Yearbook of International Law, 79 (2008), 7–85, at 29–33.
16 The royal prerogative, or simply ‘the prerogative’, is the tightly circumscribed residue of discretionary
sovereign power not surrendered by the Crown under the terms of the constitutional monarchy instituted in
England in the late seventeenth century and prevailing in the contemporary United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland. Under the same terms, at least as they have evolved, the prerogative is exercised on the
monarch’s behalf by the executive government.
17 Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer (No. 3) [1982] AC 888, at 931.
18 Buttes, ibid., at 932. It can only be assumed that a cognate doctrine would apply under Scots law and the law of
Northern Ireland.
19 Buttes, ibid., at 938. 20 Ibid., at 932.
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thereon in the immediate run-up to the invasion of Iraq by the United States, the UK
and Australia in 2003. The essence of the variety of defences raised in each case
was that the defendants had acted as they did in order to prevent a crime, the
argument being that the UK’s and/or the US’s preparation for and participation in
the invasion of Iraq constituted the crime of aggression under customary interna-
tional law – on the part, presumably, of the responsible ﬁgures in the respective
governments – and, as such, was cognizable as the crime of aggression under the
common law of England and Wales, since customary international law was part of
the common law. The question put to their Lordships on ﬁnal appeal by the
defendants was whether the crime of aggression formed part of English criminal
law in the absence of legislation to this effect and, if so, whether the issues it raised
were justiciable.
The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeals. Aggression was not a
crime under English law. Lords Bingham and Hoffmann gave the leading
judgments,21 with which Lords Rodger, Carswell and Mance agreed, the last
adding a few paragraphs of his own. All three substantive judgments were founded
on essentially the same reasoning.
Lord Bingham was willing to accept, as had the Crown,22 the ‘general truth’ of
the appellant-defendants’ core contention, for which there was ‘old and high
authority’,23 that customary international law is part of the law of England and
Wales, even if he hesitated to embrace the proposition ‘in quite the unqualiﬁed
terms in which it has often been stated’, sympathising as he did with Brierly’s view
that customary international law ‘is not a part, but is one of the sources, of English
law’.24 But his Lordship’s reading of the authorities led him to conclude ‘that
“customary international law is applicable in the English courts only where the
constitution permits”’.25 In this light, since the courts had surrendered their com-
mon law power to create crimes, statute was now the sole source of new offences in
England and Wales;26 and a raft of Acts showed that, when domestic effect was
sought to be given to crimes under customary international law, the practice was to
legislate.27 In the latter regard, Lord Bingham noted that Parliament had con-
sciously opted not to legislate for the crime of aggression during the passage of
the International Criminal Court Act 2001.28 All this reﬂected what had become ‘an
21 It was the convention in the House of Lords that the respective Law Lords always gave individual judgments
(formally referred to as ‘opinions’, rather than ‘judgments’, to reﬂect the Judicial Committee’s formal status as
a committee of the legislature, rather than a court).
22 The convention in the UK is that crimes are prosecuted in the name of the sovereign, hence the standard case
name ‘R v. [defendant]’ (more fully, ‘Regina v. [defendant]’ and, at other times, ‘Rex v. [defendant]’).
23 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 11.
24 Ibid., citing J. L. Brierly, ‘International Law in England’, Law Quarterly Review, 51 (1935), 24–35, at 31.
25 Ibid., at para. 23, quoting R. O’Keefe, ‘Customary International Crimes in English Courts’, British Yearbook of
International Law, 72 (2001), 293–335, at 335.
26 Ibid., at para. 28, citing Knuller, supra note 12. 27 Ibid., at para. 28. 28 Ibid.
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important democratic principle’ in the UK, namely, ‘that it is for those representing
the people of the country in Parliament, not the executive and not the judges, to
decide what conduct should be treated as lying so far outside the bounds of what is
acceptable . . . as to attract criminal penalties’.29 One needed very compelling
reasons to depart from this principle,30 and, with the crime of aggression, the
compelling reasons were to the contrary:
A charge of aggression, if laid against an individual in a domestic court, would involve
determination of his responsibility as a leader but would presuppose commission of the
crime by [this] state or a foreign state. Thus resolution of the charge would (unless the issue
had been decided by the Security Council or some other third party) call for a decision on the
culpability in going to war either of Her Majesty’s Government or a foreign government, or
perhaps both if the states had gone to war as allies. But there are well-established rules that the
courts will be very slow to review the exercise of prerogative powers in relation to the conduct
of foreign affairs and the deployment of the armed services, and very slow to adjudicate upon
rights arising out of transactions entered into between sovereign states on the plane of
international law.31
These considerations were not, ‘in the present context’, issues of justiciability, to
which many of the judicial authorities cited by his Lordship were directed; rather,
they were factors to be taken into account in considering ‘whether the customary
international law crime of aggression ha[d] been, or should be, tacitly assimilated
into . . . domestic law’.32 That is, in deciding whether to recognise a common law
crime of aggression, it was ‘very relevant’ that the adjudication of any such crime
‘would draw the courts into an area which, in the past, they ha[d] entered, if at all,
with reluctance and the utmost circumspection’.33
Lord Hoffmann also invoked ‘the democratic principle’ – deferred to by the courts
in modern times34 and applicable equally to the incorporation into domestic law of
crimes under international law35 – ‘that it is nowadays for Parliament and Parliament
alone to decide whether conduct not previously regarded as criminal should be made
an offence’.36 New domestic offences ‘should . . . be debated in Parliament, deﬁned
in a statute and come into force on a prescribed date’.37 Moreover, since aggression
was ‘a crime in which the principal is always the state itself’, the liability of
individuals being ‘in a sense secondary’, the prosecution of aggression in the
domestic courts would, in the absence of statutory authority, be ‘inconsistent with
a fundamental principle of [the] constitution’.38 There was ﬁrst ‘the theoretical
difﬁculty of the courts, as the judicial branch of government, holding not merely
29 Ibid., at para. 29. 30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., at para. 30. Lord Bingham’s reference to the ‘commission of the crime by [this] state or a foreign state’ is
merely ﬁgurative. His Lordship is not suggesting that a state is formally capable of criminal responsibility.
32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., at para. 61. 35 Ibid., at para. 62. 36 Ibid., at para. 60.
37 Ibid., at para. 62. 38 Ibid., at para. 63.
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that some ofﬁcer of the state has acted unlawfully . . . but, as a sine qua non condition,
that the state itself, of which the courts form part, has acted unlawfully’.39 Then there
was ‘the practical difﬁculty that the making of war and peace and the disposition of
the armed forces has always been regarded as a discretionary power of the Crown
into the exercise of which the courts will not inquire’.40 His Lordship thought that to
say that these matters are not justiciable ‘may be simply another way of putting the
same point’.41 But he did not accept the implication that one could start by determin-
ing whether aggression was a crime under English law and then proceed to consider
whether the issues it raised were justiciable. Rather, the ‘discretionary nature or non-
justiciability of the power to make war’ was ‘simply one of the reasons why
aggression [was] not a crime in domestic law’.42
LordMance, too, highlighted that the courts’ power to recognise new crimes had
not survived. The creation and regulation of crimes was, in a modern parliamentary
democracy, ‘a matter par excellence for Parliament to debate and legislate’.43
‘Even crimes under public international law [could] no longer be, if they ever
were, the subject of any automatic reception or recognition in domestic law by the
courts.’44 This was all the more so in the case of aggression, ‘a crime committed
primarily by the state itself’.45 The ‘incongruity’ of its possible recognition by the
courts was underlined by its deliberate exclusion from the International Criminal
Court Act.46
28.3 Legal Obstacles to Prosecuting a Statutory
Crime of Aggression?
Dicta in Jones (Margaret)might be taken to suggest that any crime of aggression as
may in future be enacted into domestic law in the UK would pose fundamental
problems of adjudicative competence for the courts insofar as it would require the
latter to scrutinise, on the one hand, the legality of the conduct of the UK as such
and of the executive branch of its government and, on the other hand, the interna-
tional legality of the conduct of foreign states. It might also be thought problematic
that adjudging the crime of aggression, whether allegedly committed by a UK
ofﬁcial or by a foreign state ofﬁcial,47 would compel the courts to have regard to the
unincorporated provisions of a treaty, in the form of the Charter of the United
Nations. In reality, however, a statutory crime of aggression in the UK would pose
no insurmountable obstacles in any of these regards.
39 Ibid., at para. 65. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., at para. 67. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., at para. 101. 44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., at para. 103. 46 Ibid., at para. 104.
47 The term ‘foreign state ofﬁcial’ is used in this chapter to refer to a person who, at the time of the alleged
commission by that person of the crime of aggression, was an ofﬁcial of a foreign state. It does not presuppose
that the person possessed the nationality of that state at that time or possesses it when prosecuted.
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28.3.1 Judicial Scrutiny of the Conduct of the UK and of its Executive
In Jones (Margaret), Lord Hoffmann asserted that, since aggression was ‘a crime in
which the principal is always the state itself’, the liability of individuals being ‘in
a sense secondary’, the prosecution of a UK ofﬁcial in the UK courts for the crime of
aggression would, ‘in the absence of statutory authority’, be ‘inconsistent with
a fundamental principle of [the] constitution’.48 His Lordship gave two reasons for
this: the ﬁrst, also seemingly advanced by Lord Mance, being the ‘theoretical
difﬁculty’ of the courts’ hypothetical scrutiny of the conduct of the UK; the second,
posited also by Lord Bingham and agreed with by Lord Mance, being the ‘practical
difﬁculty’ of the courts’ scrutiny of non-justiciable exercises of the prerogative by the
executive. But neither argument is persuasive, even on its own terms, and neither,
more to the point, could prevail in the face of the legislature’s statutory enactment of
a crime of aggression.
28.3.1.1 The ‘Theoretical Difﬁculty’ of Scrutinising
the Conduct of the UK
Lord Hoffmann argued in Jones (Margaret) that the hypothetical prosecution of a
common law crime of aggression allegedly committed by a UK ofﬁcial was bede-
villed by ‘the theoretical difﬁculty of the courts, as the judicial branch of government,
holding not merely that some ofﬁcer of the state has acted unlawfully . . . but, as
a sine qua non condition, that the state itself, of which the courts form part, has acted
unlawfully’.49 Similarly, Lord Mance – in a comment potentially relevant, it would
seem, as much to the domestic adjudication of a crime of aggression as to its judicial
creation – alluded to the ‘incongruity’ of the recognition by the courts of what he
characterised as ‘a crime committed primarily by the state itself’.50 The apparent
suggestion by their Lordships is that it would be logically absurd, and as a result
somehow unconstitutional, for the courts of the UK to pronounce on the interna-
tional legality of the conduct of the same UK of which they themselves are
a constituent part.
But the logical absurdity argument is ﬂawed. As the international legal person
whose conduct would need, by way of preliminary determination in the course of
prosecuting an individual for the crime of aggression, to be adjudged an act of
aggression in manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations,51 the UK is
not to be viewed as the disaggregable sum of the legislative, executive and judicial
48 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 63. 49 Ibid., at para. 65.
50 Ibid., at para. 103. That Lord Mance’s argument goes, at least in part, to the point advanced by Lord Hoffmann
is suggested at para. 103, where his Lordship expressly agrees with Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning. As with Lord
Bingham, it is worth clarifying that Lord Mance’s reference to the commission of the crime ‘by the state itself’
is merely ﬁgurative.
51 Article 8 bis(1) of the Statute.
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branches of its government. International law conceives of the juridical person of
the state as a formal abstraction wholly distinct from, and more than, the organs and
ofﬁcials which together constitute its domestic legal and socio-political reality.52
Putting it simply, the ‘state’whose acts would be at issue in the adjudication before
the UK courts of a crime of aggression on the part of a UK ofﬁcial is a separate
conceptual entity from any ‘state’ of which those courts might, as a question of
domestic law53 and real life, be said to form part. As a consequence, there would be
no logical absurdity involved in any preliminary determination by a UK court that
conduct by the UK amounted to an act of aggression in manifest violation of the
UN Charter, just as no such absurdity would be involved in any determination to
the same effect with respect to a foreign state. Even less could such a preliminary
determination be considered unconstitutional for the sole reason that it would
necessitate domestic judicial scrutiny of the conduct of the UK.
It is true that the courts of England and Wales, of Scotland and of Northern
Ireland may not purport to hold the UK formally responsible under international
law or liable under domestic law for a breach of international law. But the
explanation for this is not the theoretical impossibility of doing so. They simply
lack the jurisdiction ratione personae54 and ratione materiae.55 It does not follow
from this want of procedural competence to adjudicate a claim against the UK
under public international law that the domestic courts are incompetent to rule on
the international legality of the UK’s conduct as a preliminary determination en
route to adjudging the liability under domestic law of a natural or legal person
validly before them.56 In terms of the crime of aggression, the fact that the domestic
courts may not hold the UK formally responsible under international law or liable
under domestic law for an act of aggression would not bar them from ﬁnding, as
52 In the words of H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart, 1952), 100, ‘as a juristic
person the state is the personiﬁcation of a social order, constituting the community we call “state”’.
As explained in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session,
23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001’, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 35, the attribution to the state of the
conduct of its organs and ofﬁcials is simply a pragmatic recognition of ‘the elementary fact that the State’, being
no more than an abstraction, ‘cannot act of itself’, and ‘is necessarily a normative operation’.
53 As it is, in contrast to the situation under the domestic law of many states, no domestic legal concept of ‘the
state’, as formally distinct from the various ministries of its government and individual ofﬁcers, is known to any
of the three bodies of domestic law applicable in the UK.
54 The UK cannot be made a defendant to a claim in the English, Scottish or Northern Irish courts.
55 Pure questions of public international law – that is, questions of public international law in their own right,
rather than necessarily incidental to questions of domestic law – are not justiciable before the courts of the UK.
See, for example, Cook v. Sprigg [1899] AC 572, at 578; J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) v. Department of Trade
and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, at 499 (Lord Oliver); R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. PrimeMinister
[2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin), 126 ILR 727, at para. 36 (Simon Brown LJ);MacCormick v. Lord Advocate 1953
SC 396, at 413 (Lord President). As is clear from his Lordship’s citation of Rayner and Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament in support of his argument, this is one aspect of what Lord Bingham refers to in Jones (Margaret),
supra note 2, at para. 30, as the domestic courts’ ‘slow[ness] to adjudicate upon rights arising out of
transactions entered into between sovereign states on the plane of international law’.
56 It is worth highlighting in this connection the long-established position of the UK courts that public interna-
tional law is a body of law known to the court.
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a step towards determining whether the legal conditions for a domestic crime of
aggression were met, that the UK had engaged in an act of aggression constituting
a manifest violation of the UN Charter.
Indeed, the courts of the UK regularly examine the international lawfulness of
the UK’s past or prospective conduct in the course of deciding cases brought under
domestic law against respondents amenable to their jurisdiction. For example,57 an
inquiry into whether a public authority has acted contrary to section 6 of the Human
Rights Act 199858 is – in substantive albeit not formal essence – an inquiry into
whether the UK has breached the European Convention onHuman Rights, while an
inquiry into whether a public authority has acted contrary to section 2 of the
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 is, at root, an inquiry into whether
the UK has breached the Refugee Convention.59 Take also the UK courts’ permis-
sible and frequent interpretative recourse to the text of a treaty to which the UK is
party to resolve, in favour of a construction in line with the treaty, any ambiguity in
the text of a later Act:60 the operative presumption, that Parliament does not intend
to legislate in a way that would place the UK in breach of the treaty, involves the
courts in an implicit assessment of the international lawfulness of the legislative
practice of the UK.
As it is, it pays to recall Lord Hoffmann’s precise words when introducing both
his ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ arguments, namely that the prosecution of aggres-
sion in the domestic courts would, ‘in the absence of statutory authority’, be
unconstitutional.61 Quite how statutory authority could overcome the purported
problem of logical absurdity is not, it must be said, self-evident; but the fact
remains that his Lordship considered that the problem fell away with the passage
of statute, and the point to be made is that any crime of aggression as may in future
become domestic law in the UK would be statutory.
57 It might be argued in response to the ﬁrst two examples given in the text that, in the case of aggression, the
determination that the UK has breached international law would be more in the nature of a prerequisite, as
distinct from the collateral implication involved in the examples. But the harder one looks at the distinction, the
more elusive and unworkable it becomes. In addition, what distinction there may be does not hold good for the
third example given in the text.
58 Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes it ‘unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is
incompatible with a Convention right’, while section 1 speciﬁes that the term ‘Convention rights’ as used in the
Act means the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in, inter alia, articles 2–12 and 14 of the ECHR and
articles 1–3 of its First Protocol, as read with articles 16–18 of the former.
59 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954), 189
UNTS 2545. Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 states that ‘nothing in the immigra-
tion rules (within the meaning of the [Immigration Act 1971]) shall lay down any practice which would be
contrary to the [Refugee Convention]’. See, for example, R (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Immigration
Ofﬁcer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 AC 1.
60 See, for example, Garland v. British Railway Engineering Ltd [1983] 2 AC 751, at 771 (Lord Diplock); R v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, at 747–48 (Lord Bridge), 760–61
(Lord Ackner).
61 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 63.
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28.3.1.2 The Non-Justiciability of Relevant Exercises
of the Prerogative
In ruling out the judicial recognition of a common-law crime of aggression, Lord
Hoffmann spoke in Jones (Margaret) of ‘the practical difﬁculty’ implicated by the
hypothetical prosecution of the crime ‘that the making of war and peace and the
disposition of the armed forces has always been regarded as a discretionary power
of the Crown into the exercise of which the courts will not inquire’.62 In the same
vein, as one of his ‘compelling reasons’ against judicial recognition of a common
law crime of aggression, Lord Bingham cited the UK courts’ slowness to review the
executive’s exercise of the prerogatives over the conduct of foreign affairs and the
deployment of the armed forces.63 In the context of Jones (Margaret) itself, with its
focus on the judicial creation of the crime, their Lordships saw the question as more
than one of justiciability; but it is clear that, were a crime of aggression already to
exist under the domestic law of the UK, the question would be no less one of
justiciability.64 In this light, the implication that might be drawn from an insufﬁ-
ciently attentive reading of their Lordships’ dicta65 is that the prosecution of a
domestic crime of aggression allegedly committed by a member of the UK execu-
tive may well be barred by the non-justiciability of the relevant exercises of the
prerogative.
But it is highly doubtful whether a pre-existing domestic crime of aggression
would be non-justiciable in the UK courts. The non-justiciability of certain exercises
of the prerogative is a doctrine of administrative law whose applicability to criminal
law is far from obvious, to say the least. The rationale for the non-justiciability of the
prerogative power to make war, as recalled by Lord Hoffmann in Jones (Margaret),
is that the power is inherently discretionary.66 No legal standard exists by which to
judge whether the realm should go to war. Law is not the yardstick of a purely
political judgement. The same goes for the exercise of the prerogatives over the
conduct of foreign affairs and the deployment of the armed forces. But when the
question is whether an exercise of a prerogative power is criminal, a legal yardstick
exists. Putting it another way, a decision-maker enjoys no discretion to commit
a crime (unless the legislature grants it). Any political discretion vested in him or
62 Ibid., at para. 65. Lord Mance agreed, at para. 103, with the reasoning of both Lord Bingham and Lord
Hoffmann, his dictum as to the ‘incongruity’ of judicial recognition of ‘a crime committed primarily by the
state itself’ being directed in equal part towards this point.
63 Ibid., at para. 30.
64 Recall ibid., where Lord Bingham states that ‘in the present context’ the matter goes beyond the question of
justiciability ‘to which many of [the cited] authorities were directed’, and ibid., at para. 67, where Lord
Hoffmann concedes that to say that the relevant exercises of the prerogative are not justiciable ‘may be simply
another way of putting the same point’.
65 None of their Lordships states that the prosecution of a common law crime of aggression would be barred as
such by non-justiciability.
66 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 65, citing Chandler v.Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763,
at 806–12 (Lord Devlin) and Council of Civil Service Unions v.Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
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her is fettered to the extent of the criminal law. Just as it would be startling were the
non-justiciability of the prerogative powers over foreign affairs, war and the armed
forces to bar the prosecution in the UK courts of a UK government ofﬁcial for
ordering a war crime,67 it would be a striking abrogation of the rule of law were the
non-justiciability of the same prerogatives to preclude the prosecution in the UK of
a UK ofﬁcial for the crime of aggression. Political discretion ends where the criminal
law begins.
Anyway, it is important to recall once more Lord Hoffmann’s prefatory state-
ment that the prosecution of aggression in the domestic courts would be uncon-
stitutional ‘in the absence of statutory authority’.68 In other words, should the
legislature – be it the UK Parliament at Westminster or a competent devolved
legislature like the Scottish Parliament – enact a law the application of which
requires the courts to scrutinise what might otherwise be non-justiciable conduct on
the part of the executive, the courts are authorised, indeed compelled, to scruti-
nise that conduct so as to permit the legislation’s application. Under the UK
constitution, the will of Parliament (and, within the bounds of their powers, of its
devolved analogues) is supreme. The executive may not hide behind the cloak of
non-justiciability should Parliament render the matter at hand justiciable. In this
light, were the relevant legislature in the UK to enact a domestic crime of
aggression on the Kampala model, it is clear that the domestic courts would be
statutorily authorised to examine and determine whether the defendant’s conduct
in the exercise of the prerogative powers over the conduct of foreign affairs, the
making of war and the deployment of the armed forces satisﬁed the elements of
the crime.
28.3.2 Judicial Scrutiny of the Conduct of Foreign States
The second of Lord Bingham’s ‘compelling reasons’ in Jones (Margaret) for not
recognising a common law crime of aggression was the domestic courts’ slowness
‘to adjudicate upon rights arising out of transactions entered into between sover-
eign states on the plane of international law’.69 The reference is in part to the
doctrine of the non-justiciability of foreign sovereign acts developed by Lord
Wilberforce in Buttes.70 To this might be added the narrower doctrine of non-
justiciability known as the ‘foreign act of State’ doctrine, applicable to the acts of
a foreign state within its own territory. Neither, however, would bar a preliminary
determination, in the course of the prosecution in the UK courts of a foreign state
67 See International Criminal Court (UK) Act 2001, sections 52, 55 (England and Wales) and sections 59, 62
(Northern Ireland); International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001, sections 2, 7.
68 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 63. 69 Ibid., at para. 30.
70 Ibid., where in support of his argument Lord Bingham cites Buttes, supra note 17, at 932.
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ofﬁcial for a statutory crime of aggression, that the foreign state in question had
committed an act of aggression in manifest violation of the UN Charter.
28.3.2.1 ‘Buttes’ Non-Justiciability
It will be recalled that, in Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer (No. 3), Lord
Wilberforce, identifying a lack of ‘judicial or manageable standards’71 by which
to do so, posited that the English courts will not adjudicate on the legality, under
municipal or international law, of ‘the transactions of foreign sovereign states’72 or,
putting it another way, of ‘acts done abroad by virtue of sovereign authority’.73
It was to this doctrine, inter alia, that Lord Bingham explicitly alluded in Jones
(Margaret), where his Lordship’s point was that the prosecution of a foreign state
ofﬁcial for a crime of aggression in connection with an alleged act of aggression by
his or her state would ‘draw the courts into an area which, in the past, they have
entered, if at all, with reluctance and the utmost circumspection’.74
Lord Bingham is doubtless right that the prosecution of the crime of aggression
would in relevant cases compel the courts to examine the legality of what would
ordinarily be the non-justiciable conduct of a foreign sovereign. But it is important
to stress that ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability would not actually bar a UK court from
making, in the course of adjudicating the crime of aggression, the requisite
preliminary determination in relation to the conduct of the foreign state over
which the defendant was in a position effectively to exercise control or over
whose political or military action the defendant was in a position to direct.75
First, in Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company (Nos. 4 and 5),
which Lord Bingham himself acknowledges in Jones (Margaret) to establish an
exception to the doctrine espoused in ‘Buttes’,76 the House of Lords, highlighting
the rationale for the doctrine in the lack of ‘judicial or manageable standards’,77
held that ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability is inapplicable where ‘[t]he standard being
applied by the court is clear and manageable, and the outcome not in doubt’78 – that
is, where the breach of the relevant law is ‘plain beyond dispute’.79 In this light,
there is little reason to think that the foreign state conduct at indirect issue in the
adjudication of the crime of aggression would be beyond the rightful purview of the
UK courts. In order to found a crime of aggression by a state ofﬁcial, the act of
aggression by that ofﬁcial’s state must, at least according to the deﬁnition of the
71 Buttes, supra note 17, at 938. 72 Ibid., at 931. 73 Ibid., at 932.
74 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 30.
75 Note, again, that his Lordship does not go so far as to say that the domestic prosecution of the crime of
aggression in these circumstances would be barred as such by the ‘Buttes’ doctrine.
76 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 30. 77 Buttes, supra note 17, at 938.
78 Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company (Nos. 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] AC 883, at
para. 26 (Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Hoffmann agreed).
79 Ibid., at para. 140 (Lord Hope).
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crime agreed four years after Jones (Margaret) in Kampala, ‘by its character,
gravity and scale’ constitute ‘a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations’;80 and while it is arguable that the adjective ‘manifest’ is used in the
deﬁnition in something other than its usual sense, to denote more the seriousness
than the obviousness of the violation, it is unlikely that the term can be entirely
divorced from its ordinary meaning.81 In other words, the very deﬁnition of the
crime of aggression presupposes that the violation of the UNCharter by the foreign
state will be ‘plain beyond dispute’ and cognizable therefore by the UK courts.82
Second, and ultimately determinatively, a statutory crime of aggression would
amount in relevant cases to a legislative directive to the courts to examine and come,
by way of necessary preliminary determination, to a ﬁnding on the international
lawfulness of a foreign state’s conduct – a directive, Parliament being supreme, that
would trump the common law doctrine of ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability. Nor would this
be a novelty. For example, the courts have frequent cause to consider whether, in
accordance with regulation 5(1) of the Refugee or Person in Need of International
Protection (Qualiﬁcation) Regulations 2006, a person is a refugee, a determination
which regularly requires them to ask whether an act of persecution by a foreign state
is ‘sufﬁciently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of
a basic human right’83 or ‘includ[es] a violation of a human right which is sufﬁciently
severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner’.84 Likewise, a decision by an
extradition court under section 21(1) of the Extradition Act 2003 that a person’s
extradition pursuant to, inter alia, a European arrest warrant would be incompa-
tible with the Convention rights secured to that person by the Human Rights Act
1998 necessarily involves a judicial determination that substantial grounds exist
for believing that, if extradited, the person faces a real risk of a violation by the
requesting state, and in relevant cases a ‘ﬂagrant’ violation, of pertinent provi-
sions of the European Convention on Human Rights. Neither determination is
barred by ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability. In short, as in other areas of domestic law in
the UK, the necessity for the courts preliminarily to rule on the international
legality of a foreign state’s conduct in the course of adjudging, in relevant cases,
a statutory crime of aggression would presuppose the question’s justiciability.
80 Article 8 bis(1) of the Statute.
81 See Oxford English Dictionary, ‘manifest’, meaning A.1.a, viz. ‘clearly revealed to the . . . judgement’, ‘obvious’.
82 It might be objected that the argument leads to a ‘catch 22’ whereby a foreign state’s conduct on the plane of
international law is justiciable in the UK courts if it amounts to an act of aggression in manifest violation of the
Charter, but that the non-justiciability of a foreign state’s conduct on the plane of international law bars the UK
courts from determining whether it amounts to an act of aggression in manifest violation of the Charter. But the
conundrum is inherent in the merits-based exception to ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability posited by the House of
Lords in Kuwait Airways. The Lords clearly envisaged that the courts would not be hamstrung by this logical
nicety.
83 Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualiﬁcation) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/2525,
regulation 5(1)(a).
84 Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualiﬁcation) Regulations 2006, regulation 5(1)(b).
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28.3.2.2 The Foreign Act of State Doctrine
In addition to and predating the broad doctrine of ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability, there
exists in English85 law a narrower rule as to the non-justiciability of foreign state
conduct. Should an English court be called on to give effect to foreign law or to
some other act done by a foreign state within its own territory, it will give such
effect without inquiring into the legality, under either municipal or international
law, of that law or act.86 In the words of the well-worn saying, the English courts
‘will not sit in judgment’ on the acts of a foreign state within its own territory. This
territorially bounded rule as to the non-justiciability of foreign state conduct –
known as the ‘act of state’ doctrine or, more precisely, the ‘foreign act of state’
doctrine – is said to reﬂect the sovereign equality of states and to be based on
considerations of international comity. Lord Bingham implicitly endorsed it in
Jones (Margaret)87 in the context of his ‘compelling reasons’ for declining to
recognise a common law crime of aggression. From this the unintended implica-
tion might be drawn that, insofar as some of the acts listed in paragraph 2 of
article 8 bis of the Rome Statute take place within the putative aggressor state’s
territory,88 domestic judicial consideration of whether they constitute acts of
aggression in manifest violation of the UN Charter would be precluded by the
foreign act of state doctrine.
Again, however, any such conclusion would be incorrect. The foreign act of
state doctrine would no more bar the UK courts from determining, as a preliminary
matter, that a foreign state had committed an act of aggression constituting
a manifest violation of the UN Charter than would ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability.
To begin with, in an exception to the foreign act of state doctrine, an English
court will not give effect to foreign law or to other acts of a foreign state within its
territory where to do so would be contrary to English public policy; and the House
of Lords held in Kuwait Airways that to give effect to foreign law or to other
territorial acts of a foreign state that constitute ‘ﬂagrant’89 or ‘gross’90 violations of
85 Again, it can only be presumed that a cognate doctrine would apply under Scots law and the law of Northern
Ireland.
86 See, for example, A. M. Luther & Co. v. James Sagor & Co. [1921] KB 532; Kuwait Airways, supra note 78.
87 See Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 30, where, as is not uncommon, his Lordship elides the foreign act
of state doctrine with the broader doctrine of ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability. Having cited Buttes as an example of
the English courts’ ‘slow[ness] to adjudicate upon rights arising out of transactions entered into between
sovereign states on the plane of international law’, Lord Bingham recalls Lord Wilberforce in Buttes quoting
with approval the seminal statement of the narrower doctrine by Fuller CJ of the US Supreme Court in
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 US 250 (1897), at 252 (‘Every sovereign state is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory.’)
88 See article 8 bis(2)(f), (g) of the Statute.
89 Kuwait Airways, supra note 78, at paras. 20 (Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Hoffmann agreed), 107, 113–16
(Lord Steyn), 148–49 (Lord Hope).
90 Ibid., at paras. 29 (Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Hoffmann agreed), 113 (Lord Steyn).
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international lawwould be ipso facto contrary to English public policy. In this light,
since the foreign state’s act of aggression would need by deﬁnition to constitute
a manifest – synonymously, ﬂagrant – violation of the UN Charter to found a crime
of aggression, it would by deﬁnition be justiciable.91 It is true that one of their
Lordships took the view that the exception did not necessarily apply in respect of
every rule of international law,92 while two others referred consistently to the rules
at issue in that case as rules ‘of fundamental importance’.93 But the prohibition on
the use of inter-state force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the yardstick by which
the state conduct speciﬁed in article 8 bis(2) is to be measured or not an act of
aggression constituting a manifest violation of the Charter, was precisely the rule at
issue in Kuwait Airways, where it was held to ground the exception to the foreign
act of state doctrine adumbrated in that case.
As it is, moreover, even were the foreign act of state doctrine to pose an obstacle,
the fact that any future crime of aggression under English, Scots or Northern Irish
law would be statutory would again make the conclusive difference. Just as with
‘Buttes’ non-justiciability, any Act providing for a crime of aggression would in
relevant cases represent a legislative directive to the courts to reach the necessary
preliminary determination as to international lawfulness of a foreign state’s con-
duct within its own territory, and this legislative directive would override the
common law foreign act of state doctrine.
28.3.3 Judicial Consideration of Unincorporated Treaty Provisions
A provision of a treaty to which the UK is party cannot give rise to rights,
obligations or liabilities under English, Scots or Northern Irish law unless and
until Parliament or the relevant devolved legislature enacts legislation to give effect
to it.94 Putting it another way, treaties are not ‘self-executing’ in the UK.95 A
corollary of this is the general rule that the UK courts have no jurisdiction to
interpret, apply or otherwise have regard to an unincorporated treaty provision (viz.
a treaty provision that has not been given domestic effect by legislation), since the
91 What is said supra note 82 in relation to ‘Buttes’ non-justiciability is applicablemutatis mutandis to the foreign
act of state doctrine.
92 Kuwait Airways, supra note 78, at para. 114 (Lord Steyn). Lord Hope made no such qualiﬁcation.
93 Ibid., at paras. 20, 29 (Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Hoffmann agreed). See also ibid., at para. 29 (‘such
a fundamental breach of international law’). But compare ibid., at para. 29, citing Oppenheim to the effect that
‘international law, for its part, recognises that a national court may properly decline to give effect to legislative
and other acts of foreign states which are in violation of international law’ simplicter.
94 The principle is so well established that, in In reMcKerr [2004] UKHL 12, [2004] 1WLR 807, at para. 63, Lord
Hoffmann stated that ‘it should no longer be necessary to cite authority for the proposition that . . . an
international treaty . . . is not part of English domestic law’. The same goes for Scots law and the law of
Northern Ireland.
95 There are exceptions to this rule, but they are very few, and are now, for all intents and purposes, of historical
curiosity value only.
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courts of none of the three jurisdictions within the UK enjoy the jurisdiction to
adjudge pure questions of public international law – that is, questions of public
international law not necessarily incidental to questions of domestic law.96 In short,
unincorporated treaty provisions are not, as a general rule, justiciable in the UK
courts.97 This may be thought to pose a problem for the adjudication of the crime of
aggression. Determining whether the defendant has committed the crime of aggres-
sion would require the court ﬁrst to determine whether an act of aggression by the
state (be it the UK or a foreign state) over which the defendant was in a position
effectively to exercise control or whose political or military action the defendant
was in a position to direct constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations. This would compel the court to have regard to article 2(4) and
perhaps articles 42 and 51, respectively, of the Charter, and none of these articles
has been or, indeed, is logically capable of being incorporated into English, Scots or
Northern Irish law.
But a UK court may have regard to an unincorporated treaty provision where this
is necessary to determine rights, obligations or liabilities under domestic law.98
The court’s jurisdiction to do so is necessarily incidental to its self-evident jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate upon questions of domestic law. In this light, there is no doubt
whatsoever but that, were the legislature to enact a domestic crime of aggression,
the legality of the putative act of aggression by the relevant state – the preliminary
determination of which would constitute a prerequisite to the court’s adjudication
of the offence – would thereby be rendered justiciable.
28.4 Judicial Dicta on the Crime of Aggression
While rejecting the crime of aggression’s punishability at common law, the
House of Lords in Jones (Margaret) nonetheless offered dicta on the customary
international legal content, as they saw it, of the crime as it was then said to exist,
four years before the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala. These
dicta are not without interest. But their accuracy was open to doubt even at the
time. Furthermore, and more signiﬁcantly, it is likely that the relevant customary
international law has since been affected by the positions staked out by states in
the lead-up to and at the Kampala conference and by the compromise eventually
struck there.
96 Recall supra note 55.
97 See, for example, Rayner, supra note 55, at 499 (Lord Oliver); MacCormick, supra note 55, at 413 (Lord
President). This non-justiciability cannot be waived by the parties, as made clear in Republic of Ecuador
v.Occidental Exploration and Production Co. [2005] EWCA Civ 1116, [2006] QB 432, at para. 57 (Mance LJ,
delivering the judgment of the court).
98 See Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, supra note 55, at paras. 36, 47 (Simon Brown LJ), endorsed in
Occidental, supra note 97, at para. 31 (Mance LJ). This exception, although posited in the speciﬁc context of
English law, can be assumed apply also under Scots law and the law of Northern Ireland.
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28.4.1 R v. Jones (Margaret)
Unlike the Court of Appeal of England and Wales before them,99 their Lordships
held in Jones (Margaret) that the crime of aggression existed at the time under
customary international law with sufﬁcient clarity to permit its trial and punishment.
Lord Bingham traced the history of the prohibition on the use of force and of the
crime of aggression,100 recalling, inter alia, the crimes against peace referred to in
respective articles 6(a) of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and in Control Council
LawNo 10;101 the deﬁnition of an act of aggression in 1974GAResolution 3314; the
crime of aggression recognised in article 16 of the International Law Commission’s
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind;102 and the
reference to the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in article 5 of the
Rome Statute.103 He then addressed the point on which the House differed from
the Court of Appeal:
It was suggested, on behalf of the Crown, that the crime of aggression lacked the certainty
of deﬁnition required of any criminal offence, particularly a crime of this gravity. This
submission was based on the requirement in article 5(2) of the Rome Statute that the crime
of aggression be the subject of deﬁnition before the international court exercised jurisdic-
tion to try persons accused of that offence. This was an argument which found some
favour with the Court of Appeal. I would not for my part accept it. It is true that some
states parties to the Rome Statute have sought an extended and more speciﬁc deﬁnition of
aggression. It is also true that there has been protracted discussion of whether a ﬁnding
of aggression against a state by the Security Council should be a necessary precondition of
the court’s exercise of jurisdiction to try a national of that state accused of committing the
crime. I do not, however, think that either of these points undermines the appellants’
essential proposition that the core elements of the crime of aggression have been under-
stood, at least since 1945, with sufﬁcient clarity to permit the lawful trial (and, on
conviction, punishment) of those accused of this most serious crime. It is unhistorical to
suppose that the elements of the crime were clear in 1945 but have since become in any
way obscure.104
99 See R v. Jones (Margaret) and Others [2004] EWCA Crim 1981, [2005] QB 259, at para. 43.
100 See Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at paras. 13–18.
101 ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’, in Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the
Prosecution and Punishment of theMajor War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 284,
Annex; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, General Orders No. 1, 19 January 1946,
Tokyo, as amended, General Orders No. 20, 26 April 1946, TIAS No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20.
102 ILC, ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, Yb ILC (1996), vol. II, 15 (including
commentary).
103 It will be recalled that, in accordance with article 5(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, the Court enjoys jurisdiction
ratione materiae with respect to the crime of aggression but also that, as speciﬁed in article 5(2), the Court
shall not exercise this jurisdiction until a provision is adopted deﬁning the crime and setting out the conditions
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to it.
104 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 19, citation omitted.
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Lord Hoffmann arrived at the same conclusion:
It is true that there is at present no consensus about the circumstances in which the International
Criminal Court should exercise its jurisdiction to try the crime of aggression and in particular
whether the imprimatur of the Security Council should have to appear on the indictment. But
I think that upon analysis it will be found that these disputes are not about the deﬁnition of the
crime but about the circumstances in which the International Criminal Court (as opposed to
some domestic or ad hoc international tribunal, such as the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg) should try someone for committing it. Of course the deﬁnition of a crime so recent
and so rarely punished will have uncertainties. But that is true of other crimes as well. If the core
elements of the crime are certain enough to have secured convictions at Nuremberg, or to enable
everyone to agree that it was committed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, then it is in my opinion
sufﬁciently deﬁned to be a crime, whether in international or domestic law.105
Lord Mance agreed that there existed as a matter of customary international law ‘a
crime of aggression which is, as history conﬁrms, sufﬁciently certain to be capable
of being prosecuted in international tribunals’.106
28.4.2 The Dicta’s Value
Their Lordships’ view that aggression existed as a crime under customary inter-
national law in 2006 with enough deﬁnitional precision to enable its trial and
punishment, although not altogether implausible, is by no means compelling.
It appears based, at least on Lord Bingham’s part, on a conﬂation of an act of
aggression within the meaning of article 39 of the UN Charter, a question of state
conduct and ultimately of state responsibility, and the crime of aggression, viz.
individual criminal responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation or execu-
tion of an act of aggression by a state.107 As for Lord Hoffmann’s assertion that ‘the
core elements of the crime [were] certain enough . . . to enable everyone to agree
that it was committed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait’,108 its premise is simply
incorrect (even leaving aside his Lordship’s elision of an act of aggression and the
crime of aggression), the Security Council having determined that the invasion
constituted a breach of the peace, not an act of aggression.109 Moreover, one is left
wondering why, if the Lords’ conclusion as to the content of the crime of aggres-
sion at the time is correct, the International Law Commission was not able between
1948 and 1996 to come up with anything more than a circular deﬁnition of the
105 Ibid., at para. 59. 106 Ibid., at para. 99.
107 It will be recalled, notably, that the deﬁnition of aggression in 1974 GA Res. 3314, as relied on by Lord
Bingham, was adopted, in the words of para. 4 of the resolution, by way of ‘guidance in determining, in
accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of aggression’ by a UN member state.
108 Jones (Margaret), supra note 2, at para. 59.
109 See Security Council Resolution 660 (1990), 2 August 1990, UN Doc. S/RES/660, preamble (second
recital).
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offence,110 and why the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression of the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute continued in 2006 to struggle to
agree on a deﬁnition – and not merely, pace their Lordships, on connected
procedural questions.111 Indeed, if the Lords’ view is correct, one is left wondering
why none of them put forward a deﬁnition of the crime.
Perhaps more to the point, whatever the customary position in 2006, there is
convincing reason to think that things have moved on since then, with the
agreement in Kampala on a deﬁnition of the offence which distinguishes clearly
between an act of aggression by a state and a crime of aggression by an
individual, the latter additionally requiring, inter alia, that the act of aggression
in question, ‘by its character, gravity and scale’, constitute ‘a manifest violation
of the Charter of the United Nations’. This is not to say that the Kampala
deﬁnition of the crime of aggression currently reﬂects customary international
law. It is, however, likely that this deﬁnition has unsettled any such customary
deﬁnition as may, on an optimistic reading, have predated it. It is likely too that
any customary deﬁnition as may emerge in future will reﬂect article 8 bis of the
Rome Statute.
28.5 Conclusion
No domestic crime of aggression currently exists in the UK. But there would be no
inherent legal bar to its prosecution should the legislature choose in future to enact
one. This is not to say that such prosecution would necessarily proceed: in a case
involving a foreign state ofﬁcial,112 it would come up against the defendant’s
potential immunity, either ratione personae or ratione materiae, from the jurisdic-
tion of the UK criminal courts – a question not at issue in Jones (Margaret), where
the crime of aggression was raised ex hypothesi by the defence, rather than brought
on indictment by the prosecution. The point, however, is that, in the event that the
defendant to a charge of aggression could permissibly be proceeded against in a UK
court, the questions implicated by the adjudication of a statutory crime of aggres-
sion would be within the rightful power of those courts to determine. The same is
likely to be the case in at least certain other jurisdictions of the common law and
110 See 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 103, article 16: ‘An individual who, as leader or organizer,
actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by
a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.’
111 See ‘Informal Intersessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held at the
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, WoodrowWilson School, at Princeton University, New Jersey,
United States, from 8 to 11 June 2006’, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1, in ASP Ofﬁcial Records, ICC-ASP/5/32,
especially paras. 7–50, 84–95, Annexes I, II.
112 Perhaps needless to say, such immunities demanded by international law as may be given effect in domestic
law would be irrelevant to the prosecution of a UK ofﬁcial. Nor do any of the bodies of domestic law in the UK
accord procedural immunity to UK ofﬁcials.
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Westminster traditions. The only fundamental bar to such adjudication is the
political will to enact a crime of aggression.
Perhaps curiously, despite there being no domestic crime of aggression in the
UK, the UK courts have nonetheless had occasion to remark on the content of the
crime under customary international law. But what they said back in 2006 is
probably no longer of much use, if it ever was.
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